Complex decision making typically involves many agents attempting to aggregate many alternatives. If agents' preferences are unconstrained, cyclic outcomes are highly probable. In contrast, we show that if agents share similar models of the choice domain, then a stable collective outcome occurs with about 90% probability. These results have implications for systems of interacting agents, such as group decisions by individuals in social settings or interpretations of sense data by competing perceptual modules of a brain.
INTRODUCTION
There are abundant theoretical results from the field of social choice showing that there will almost surely be no single agreement when large numbers of individuals must choose from a large set of alternatives (e.g., Arrow, 1963; Campbell & Tullock, 1965; Jones, Rodcliff, Taber, & Timpore, 1995; Kelly, 1986) . These results have significant implications for a variety of complex systems that are engaged in collective decision making using voting-like procedures. The most obvious application is in social settings such as legislatures or committees, where a group of individuals must aggregate their diverse opinions or preferences. However, other important applications include the integration of conflicting information provided by a group of experts (e.g., Saari & Haunsperger, 1991) , where such experts may be as trivial as different sensory devices reporting to an information integration center (Clarke & Yuille, 1990; Jacobs, Jordan, Nowlan, & Hinton, 1991; Knill & Richards, 1996) . Another example is understanding the brain, which can be viewed as consisting of a large number of semiautonomous neural modules acting as agents with potentially conflicting goals (Minsky, 1986; Van Essen, Anderson, & Felleman, 1992) . If such systems are modeled as distributed collections of voters with arbitrary preferences not subject to dictatorial rule, then there is a high probability that group choices will cycle among the alternatives (Arrow, 1963; Doyle & Wellman, 1989; McKelvey, 1979 ). Yet cyclic outcomes are not typically observed. Thus a puzzle in both social and cognitive science is how and when information from a large collection of agents can be aggregated in a democratic setting to reach noncyclic, or what we refer to as stable, collective decisions.
Reexamining Arrow's (1963) general possibility theorem that no democratic aggregation procedure can guarantee a stable collective ranking, we focus on the assumption that agents may rank-order choices in any way. Specifically, we assume that agents' information is not arbitrary but is constrained by the agents' mental model of the choice domain. Now a very positive result emerges: there is a high probability of stable collective outcomes provided that a model of the domain is shared among the agents (Richards, 2001; Richards, McKay, & Richards, 1998; Runkel, 1956) . Examples of such models include the relations between animal species, kinship networks, the organization of taste choices, flow diagrams, library catalog systems, and maps (e.g., Borg & Lingoes, 1987; Chandrasekaran, Glasgow, & Narayanan, 1995; Denzau & North, 1994; Gunkel, 1999; Romney, Boyd, Moore, Batchelder, & Brazill, 1996; Schelling, 1960; Shepard, 1980) . A knowledge structure is the representational form for such models. We refer to a knowledge structure as shared when agents use similar models to rank order their preferences.
KNOWLEDGE STRUCTURES AS GRAPHS
Let the term ''agent'' be used to designate an individual-level entity that is contributing to a collective decision over a finite set of alternatives A={a 1 , ..., a n }, where A contains at least two elements. Agents organize the set of alternatives using a knowledge structure, which we assume is identical for all agents. This structure serves as a model of the choice domain and is represented as a labeled connected graph M(A, e) with a set of vertices A and a set of edges e. The vertices of the graph represent the objects, events, or behaviors-i.e. the alternatives-and the edges of the graph indicate the relationships between these alternatives. Figure 1 shows a simple example of a graph M representing parameter changes between four alternatives, a 1 , ..., a 4 . Each edge in M connecting two alternatives indicates that those alternatives differ in a single attribute. To illustrate, if the alternatives are choices among soft drinks, a 1 and a 4 may be two brands that have similar taste but differ in that one is caffeinated. Alternatives a 1 and a 2 may both have no caffeine but differ in their citrus blend, such as comparing 7-Up to Sprite.
FIG. 1.
Example of the set of four preference orders induced from a knowledge structure M.
It is a central assumption of our framework that agents' preferences are consistent with a shared internal model of the relationships among alternatives. For example, in Black's (1958) or Coombs's (1964) constraint on linear orders, if M represents a shared cognitive ordering of musical instruments, such as fluteviolin-cello-bass violin, then preferences that are inconsistent with the model, such as flute preferred to bass violin preferred to violin preferred to cello are assumed to be precluded. In our framework, the graph M is an abstraction of this shared model and serves as a constraint on agents' interpretations and preference orderings. Thus, given a most-preferred alternative, preference rankings over the remaining alternatives are assumed to be consistent with the structure of the graph M. For example, for the model M shown in Fig. 1 , an agent who most prefers alternative a 4 is assumed to rank a 1 as the second choice and to rank a 2 and a 3 as indifferent third choices. Specifically, we assume each agent has a unique most-preferred alternative, called an ideal point. Let a o be the ideal point of agent o. If the number of edges on the shortest path from a o to a i is less than the number of edges on the shortest path from a o to a j then agent o prefers a i to a j , denoted a i P o a j . If the number of edges on the shortest path from a o to a i is equal to the number of edges on the shortest path from a o to a j then we say that agent o is indifferent between a i and a j , denoted a i ' a j . Thus, each agent has a (weak) preference ordering over the alternatives in A induced from the shared model M.
We are interested in two possible outcomes: either there is a top cycle among alternatives or there is a top-ranked alternative. A top cycle exists if there is some set of alternatives such that a i is preferred to a j by a plurality of agents, a j is preferred to a k by a plurality of agents, and a k is preferred to a i by a plurality of agents, and every alternative not in the top cycle is beaten in a pairwise plurality vote by at least one alternative in the top cycle. (Note that there may be additional cycles that are not top cycles; we refer to these as local cycles.) For example, in the aggregation of information from several perceptual modules, an interpretation I 1 is unstable if there is another interpretation, I 2 , that is favored over I 1 by some majority of agents and in turn I 2 is beaten in a pairwise plurality comparison by a set of agents favoring I 3 , which in turn is favored by the original I 1 interpretation in a subsequent pairwise comparison. Such top cycles can be easily created in laboratory situations where perceptual information is controlled to be ambiguous, breaking the natural regularities and ordering relations normally encountered in the world (Gregory, 1970; Richards, Wilson, & Sommer, 1993; Rock 1983) . If there is no top cycle then there must be a top-ranked alternative, which we call a winner, namely an alternative that cannot be overturned in a pairwise vote by any other alternative. Specifically, let |a j P a k | denote the number of agents for whom a j is preferred to
is a winner if and only if for all
This definition corresponds to plurality rule, which is based on the same principle as the procedure that chooses the maximum likelihood ranking (Young, 1986) .
METHODS AND TREATMENTS
Because the combinatorics quickly lead to very large numbers of preference profiles, most results on the probability of cycles are based on Monte Carlo simulations (e.g., Campbell & Tullock, 1965; Jones et al. 1995; Klahr, 1966) . We follow suit. Our procedure is to construct a graph M n, p with n vertices (corresponding to the n alternatives) and choose each of the
possible edges independently with probability p. Only one edge is allowed between any two vertices and graphs not connected were discarded. This random connected graph M n, p determines the set of n feasible preference orders. Each preference order is assigned a weight w i , i=1, ..., n, drawn uniformly from the interval [0, 1000] . These weights create an n-tuple w={w 1 , ..., w n } representing the distribution of agents over feasible preferences. We then evaluate all ( n 2 ) pairs of alternatives to determine whether a winner exists. The result gives the probability Q(n) that the tournament induced from M n, p with weights w has a winner. Following tradition, we present the results in terms of the probability of no winner, namely 1 − Q(n). The number of trials varied between 200 and 1000 depending on the number of vertices, the edge probabilities, and the probability 1 − Q(n). The results have estimated errors of 0.03 or less for values of 1 − Q(n) between 0.2 and 1.0, errors of 0.02 or less for values of 1 − Q(n) between 0.05 and 0.2, and errors of approximately 0.003 for 1 − Q(n) less than 0.05.
RESULTS

Weakly Constrained Preferences
We begin by incorporating a small amount of constraint from the knowledge structure. Specifically, in this section it is assumed that only ideal points and alternatives adjacent to an agent's ideal point are constrained by the graph M n, p . The preference assignments for the remaining alternatives are chosen with equal probability from the set { P , ' , O }. We restrict our attention to the case of p= 1 2 , which corresponds to sampling uniformly from all labeled graphs on n vertices and which generates the greatest variety of nonisomorphic graphs for any fixed n and p.
Our first result is shown by the triangles in Fig. 2 . To provide some context, the figure also includes results from Jones et al. (1995) for randomly distributed weak preference orders (dashed line). The figure shows that by constraining preferences over only the ideal point and the alternatives adjacent to the ideal point, the probability of no winner decreases by nearly one half over random weak orders, as shown by the triangles. However, if the knowledge structure constraint is eliminated entirely, by considering only an agent's ideal point, then the probability of no winner quickly asymptotes at one. This result is shown by the solid circles in Fig. 2 . The comparison between the upper and the lower curves in this figure makes clear that, for small choice sets, incorporating even such a locally restricted constraint on feasible preferences dramatically reduces the probability of cycles. The following section shows how further improvements emerge as the scope of a shared model is increased.
FIG. 2. Probability of No Winner.
Upper curve (circles) shows results if the shared knowledge structure is ignored; middle curve (squares) shows results from Jones et al. (1995) ; lowest curve (triangles) shows the effect of a minimal knowledge constraint.
Strongly Constrained Preferences
Here we require that agents' preference orders be fully consistent with the shared model M n, p . The solid circles in Fig. 3 show the results for 3 to 100 alternatives for p= 1 2 . (Note the log scale for the ordinate.) For comparison, the triangles show our previous result when agents' preferences are constrained only by adjacent alternatives. We see that if agents use the full knowledge structure then the probability of no winner drops dramatically to less than 4% for n [ 100. In other words, for less than 100 alternatives and for knowledge structures chosen uniformly over all labeled graphs, the probability of a stable outcome is at least 96% when agents' conflicting preferences are structured by a shared model. In nearly half the cases (47%), the winner is a vertex in the graph representation with maximum degree. In two thirds of the cases (67%), the winner is a vertex with either the maximum or one less than the maximum degree.
We now explore the full set of random graphs with edge probability p varying from 0 to 1. First consider the extremes. If p=1 then M n, 1 is a fully connected graph and there is always a winner (Richards et al., 1998) . At the opposite end of the probability spectrum, edges will be sparse. Here, unrooted trees, T n , are a limiting type of connected graph (see Harary, 1969, p. 13 for a formal definition of a tree). Trees also always have a winner. This new result is an important generalization of Black's theorem (1958) which demonstrates that a winner always exists when preferences are restricted to a simple linear ordering.
Definition 1. The distance between two vertices v, w of a graph is the least number of edges on a path from v to w. Note that weights on the vertices of the graph have no bearing on the distances in the graph. We will also find it convenient to define the distance between a vertex v and an edge e: it is 1 2 more than the least of the two distances from v to the endpoints of e. Proof. Let L be the limb of T at v that contains u. From Lemma 5 we know that e(v) [ 1/2, so the weight of L is at most 1/2. Therefore, the weight of all the other limbs at v plus the weight of v total at least 1/2. Using Definition 1, these limbs (and v) are closer to v than to u, so W(v, u) \ 1/2 and W (u, v) 
COLLECTIVE CHOICE WITH SHARED KNOWLEDGE STRUCTURES
The latter can only happen if L has weight 1/2 and u ¥ C, which is excluded by the conditions of the theorem. L A more powerful result is that when the full knowledge constraint is invoked and the knowledge structure has the form of a tree; then there is a complete social ordering without cycles:
Theorem 7. For any set of weights and full knowledge depth, the social ordering induced from a tree knowledge structure has no cycles.
Proof. See Appendix.
We next consider the case where 0 < p < 1. Since the probability of top cycles is zero for p=0 or 1, the probability of no winner must reach a maximum for some 0 < p < 1. The effect of varying p for graphs with 5, 10, and 20 vertices is shown in Fig. 4 . For these graphs, the greatest probability of no winner is approximately 0.12 and occurs when the probability of an edge is approximately 0.1 to 0.2 for a uniform distribution of weights on the alternatives. Since the effect of changing the probability of an edge is to change the distribution of classes of graphs, the results make clear that the structure of the graph M n, p is a critical factor in collective stability. To further emphasize this point, a k-partite graph has an edge probability that is neither 0 nor 1, with 0°p°1. Yet, as the following theorem shows, all complete k-partite graphs have no cycles.
Theorem 8. For any set of weights, the social ordering induced from a complete k-partite graph has no cycles.
Partial Knowledge Structures
A relevant variation on the general framework is to assume that the knowledge structure constrains preferences only over a subset of vertices near an agent's ideal point rather than over the entire choice set. Define the knowledge depth, k, as the maximum distance from the ideal point over which an agent's preference order is constrained by M. A knowledge depth with indifference assumes that an agent is indifferent between all vertices more than k edges away from the agent's ideal point. Let d(a i , a j ) denote the distance between vertexes a i and a j . Then a knowledge depth of one implies that for any ideal point a i and all a j and Figure 5 illustrates the effect of reducing the knowledge depth to k=1. As in the previous figure, the probability of no winner is plotted against the probability of choosing an edge from the set of ( n 2 ) edges. For comparison, the dashed curves repeat the result from Fig. 4 when agents use the full structure of the graph. The small numbers show the new results for 5-, 10-, 20-, and 40-vertex graphs. The solid curve is drawn to suggest the upper bound for the probability of no-winner for all graphs with less than 40 vertices. Note that this curve asymptotes near 0.11 as p Q 0. To keep these probabilities in perspective, recall that the lowest probability of cycles found by Jones et al. (1995) is approximately 40%-well above the upper bounds of our results at approximately 11%.
As in the case of a full knowledge depth, unrooted trees T n give some insight into asymptotes for sparse connected graphs in the partial knowledge case. The labeled tics at the left margin of Fig. 5 show some probabilities of no-winner for the case of trees with a knowledge depth of one. Unlike the case of a full knowledge depth (where a winner was guaranteed), a partial knowledge constraint does admit the possibility of top cycles.
DISCUSSION
Shortly after Arrow's general possibility theorem showed that a majority winner could not be guaranteed for aggregation procedures satisfying a minimal set of conditions, Tullock (1967) raised the question of the significance of this result in terms of the probability of aggregation failures. Over the past three decades, a host of papers have appeared showing that unconstrained preference orders lead to a significant likelihood of no majority winner (e.g., Campbell & Tullock, 1965; DeMeyer & Plott, 1970; Garman & Kamien, 1968; Jones et al., 1995; Kelly, 1986; Klahr, 1966; Niemi & Weisberg, 1968) . The current consensus is that cycles in the collective aggregation of individual-level information are not a rare theoretical occurrence, with the probability of cycles approaching one as either the number of alternatives or the number of agents increases.
In contrast, when preferences are structured by a model shared by the agents, the probability of cycles is dramatically reduced. This knowledge structure constraint allows agents to have different preferences but places structure on relationships within the choice set. The effect of a shared knowledge structure is to markedly reduce the probability of cycles: even with a shallow knowledge depth, the probability of no winner is never greater than 12% for choice sets up to 20 alternatives. If agents' preferences are fully constrained by a shared knowledge structure then the probability of no winner is less than 5%.
An important limitation to this result is that all preference orders must be consistent with a shared model. However, in practice differences among the agents' models would be expected because similarity relationships may be asymmetric or intransitive (Coombs and Avrunin, 1977; Tversky 1969 Tversky , 1977 . Nevertheless, preliminary studies indicate that minor inconsistencies among the individual models of a domain have little effect on the probability of cycles. A much more important factor in increasing the probability of no winner is if agents vote probabilistically when they cannot discern differences between alternatives. This result is contrary to previous findings that emphasize the stabilityinducing properties of aggregating probabilistic individual choices, such as the Condorcet jury theorem. We find that stable collective outcomes are more likely if agents refrain from voting over alternatives outside their knowledge depth.
Although a stable winner occurred roughly 90% of the time when the shared model is respected, an important lesson is that the form of the knowledge structurenamely the characteristics of the model M, are an important variable in collective stability. In a previous paper we showed that certain knowledge relationships lead to top cycles whenever they appear as induced graphs (Richards et al., 1998) . The main effect of varying the probability of an edge in M is to change the distribution of the subgraphs that have a high probability of no winner. One may speculate as to the frequency of these troublesome graph forms as models in natural contexts of the social and physical world (McMahon, 1976; Richards & Bobick, 1988; Thompson, 1968) . For example, tree-like structures, radial graphs, and ''small world'' graphs (Kasturirangan, 1999; Watts & Strogatz, 1998 ) are known to be empirically prevalent representational forms. An important issue is to identify which kinds of knowledge structures depicted as graphs always insure stable outcomes. Classes of graphs presently known to guarantee stable outcomes with a full knowledge depth include (1) all covered graphs (Richards et al., 1998) , (2) (Note that w(p, q) is distinct from W(v, u) as in Definition 3. Also, as before, the weight of p itself is w(p), sometimes abbreviated w p .)
Proof of Theorem 7. We first prove two special cases and then show that the general case follows.
Case (i). Suppose the tree T is a path and distinct vertices x, y, z are on the path in that order with x and z at the ends of the path. Let a be the midpoint between x and y, and let b be the midpoint between x and z, where b may be on either side of y or equal to y. Then
Thus, W(x, y) [ W(x, z) and W(z, x) [ W(y, x) . These inequalities give implication (a): x P y S x P z. By the same reasoning with x and z exchanged, we have implication (b): z P y S z P x . Since each of the two possible cycles x P y P z P x and x P z P y P x violate one of (a) and (b), they do not exist.
Case (ii). Suppose the tree T consists of three paths joined at a common vertex v and that x, y, z are the other ends of each path. Let d(x, y) denote the distance between vertex x and y. Without loss of generality, suppose d (x, v) [ d(y, v) [ d(z, v) . Let a be the midpoint between y and z (at v or on the path from v to z), b be the midpoint between x and z (at v or on the path from v to z), and c be the midpoint between x and y (at v or on the path from v to y). Let p be a position on a tree. Define
Then
Now we consider two possibilities. If b=v, then also a=c=v, so we have W(x, y)=W (x, z), W(y, x)=W(y, z), and W(z, x)=W(z, y) . It is easy to see that this prevents {x, y, z} from forming a cycle. The remaining case is that b ] v. Then we can see from above that W(y, x) [ W(y, z), W(z, x) [ W(z, y), and W(y, z) [ W(x, z) . This gives the two implications y P x S y P z and z P x S z P y, which again prevents {x, y, z} from forming a cycle. Now we can consider the general case. Let x, y, z be arbitrary distinct points of T. The smallest subtree S of T that contains all of {x, y, z} is either a path or a star of three paths joined at some other vertex v. Consider any vertex u on S and any limb L at u that is disjoint from S. Then Eqs. (8)- (13) are unchanged if L is removed from T and its weight added to u. Continuing in this manner, we finally reach a weighting for S such that a cycle is formed by {x, y, z} in S if and only if a cycle is formed by {x, y, z} in T. However, S is one of the first two cases and so such a cycle cannot exist. L
k-Partite Knowledge Structures
Definition 11. A graph G is a complete k-partite graph if its point set V can be partitioned into subsets V 1 , ..., V k such that the edges of G join every member of V i to every member of V j for all i ] j and no edges join one member of V i to another member of V i for any i. 
